Board Thread:Lore Discussion/@comment-97.81.240.58-20130603234626/@comment-24261859-20140403222708

Smoking.Chimp wrote: Coppermantis wrote: Smoking.Chimp wrote: Coppermantis wrote: Smoking.Chimp wrote: I dunno - there's a number of possibilities.

Titus Mede II may not have been the "brilliant" strategest behind the preceding victories. He may have simply made consistently bad decisions which his generals managed to bail him out of - which would work for him just like they worked for Napoleon. In short, signing the the treaty was the one bad decision his generals couldn't bail him out of. In-game books suggest that, tactically, the opposite was true. The strategy that allowed him to claim victory in the Imperial City was one which his generals vehemently opposed, but he ignored them and was eventually vindicated.

While we cannot discount the possibility that this was imperial propaganda, there is nothing else to suggest that this is the case. I think that Titus Mede II's inability to negotiate a valid treaty gives it away. I doubt that a person who can't just say no is really capable of "fighting the ship".

And yes, I think his generals would have opposed his overall strategy - which would not have worked had those generals not been brilliant enough and, perhaps "lucky" enough, to pick up the pieces and organise all the details necessary to make it work.

I disagree. It's fully possible for someone to be tactically capable but not politiclly adroit, or vice versa.

Furthermore, you could say that of any plan. Even the most well-laid grand strategy will fail if those who actually execute it are not equally skilled, so yes, it is indeed true that the plan would not have worked if they had not been skilled enough to make it work. This doesn't reflect anything about the plan's overall validity. Well, I think Sun Tzu would argue that political savvy and tactical capability are one and the same. But, with respect to the signing of the White-Gold Concordat, the issue isn't lack of political savvy. It's the inability to say no - which could be a product of powerful illusion magic. After all, no-one who's just won even a marginal victory and is still compis signs a treaty whose terms are tantamount to surrender. On the tactical capability side, Titus Mede II put the officer in charge in a position where he could be cut off from communication with his troops, and then he waited until he was surrounded before trying to regroup (requiring a miracle of destruction even Mehrunes Dagon could envy).

These assorted miracles, performed by Titus Mede II during the ceding and retaking of the Imperial City, I find equally mystifying. Given that he penetrated enemy lines and zones of control without armour, mechanised infantry and close air support (and on more than one occasion) maybe the Thalmor are right about Talos and it's Titus Mede II who more aptly fits amoung the Nine Divines. :^)

I tend to think that there is much more to this. There is simply too much wrong with the picture; too much which makes no sense at all. Perhaps, there is something of an exaggeration here for the benefit of the enemy and, maybe, more information might become available when the Thalmor are no longer a threat. Who is to say? The influence of Illusion magic is not impossible, certainly. In fact, given the magical aptitude of the Altmer and their lack of moral scruples, one could almost say that it was probable. I imagine that an Emperor would have had some manner of training to resist being overwhelmed by such magic, but it could still have been used to subtly insinuate.

As for Sun Tzu, though it has been some time since I read The Art of War, My recollection of it was that he proposed that a ruler should be both politically and tactically capable, not necessarily that they were the same thing. So a leader that can lead an army but not a country would be just as unsuccessful as one who could lead a country but not an army.